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Enhancing rule-making and the legislative process to support the financing of the EU economy​

Day 2 Afternoon

Thursday 12 September

Room :

ROOM 2

Speakers

Chair
David Wright
EUROFI
Public Authorities
José Manuel Campa
Chairperson - European Banking Authority (EBA)
Alexandra Jour-Schroeder
Deputy Director-General - DG for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, European Commission
Louise Caroline Mogensen
Director General - Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanstilsynet)
Harald Waiglein
Director General for Economic Policy and Financial Markets - Federal Ministry of Finance, Austria
Industry Representatives
Alban Aucoin
Head of Public Affairs - Crédit Agricole S.A.
Bernhard Spalt
Chief Risk Officer - Commerzbank AG

Objectives

It is important that financial regulation is predictable, legally precise, in line with best international practice, and rigorously implemented and enforced, without regulatory arbitrage.

The aim of this session is to assess whether the criticisms of the financial industry of the way regulation is developed in Europe are well-founded, and to define their consequences for financial actors and their clients.

Speakers will also be invited to share their views on how to avoid over-regulation, over-detailing and gold-plating, and how to achieve a more flexible European legislative process that adapts more quickly to changes in market practices and stakeholders.

Points of discussion

  • Europe’s financial players complain that they have to deal with too many regulations that are too detailed and sometimes too complex, sometimes without any political, democratic or legal basis, and that the competitiveness of banks and the European economy is not taken into account when these regulations are drawn up.

Is there any truth to these criticisms of the way regulation is developed in Europe? Can you illustrate them?

Should the competitiveness of financial players be taken into account when drawing up financial regulations?How can we achieve a more flexible European legislative process that adapts more quickly to changes in market practices and stakeholders?

  • Banks in Europe often refer to the instability of their prudential regime, the regulatory stringency of their supervisor unlike that of the Fed, the level 2 or level 3 measures that lead to additional requirements that sometimes have no legal basis or are contradictory to the framework legislation.

What examples illustrate these criticisms and what are the consequences for banks in Europe?

How can we ensure that level 2 and level 3 measures respect the political balance and financial requirements defined at level 1?

How can we ensure that the European institutions avoid gold-plating and improve their supervisory role in this area?